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1. Introduction 
 
As has been widely documented, the world-wide economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 was 
accompanied by a severe fall in international trade. Baldwin (2009) characterizes the collapse as 
“sudden, severe, and synchronized… the sharpest in recorded history and deepest since WWII.” 
A number of hypotheses exist to describe what caused the collapse and why it became so 
widespread and deep (for summaries, see Baldwin 2009 and CEA 2010). In addition to the fall in 
aggregate demand, a number of supply-side factors may have played a role. Anecdotal evidence 
abounds that trade finance was restricted, which could have resulted in a decline in trade from 
the supply side. Others have noted that with the globalization of supply-chains, a fall in 
manufactures could lead to an outsized fall in total trade, particularly if supply chains are 
disrupted. Finally, protectionism rose, although not to the extent that was initially feared.  
The speed and durability of the recovery could depend on which margin, extensive or 
intensive,2 has been the most affected by the crisis, and by how fast it responds to fiscal stimulus.  
For VOXEU, Peter Schott wrote in November 2009 that “If the current ‘shock’ to US trade is 
similar to those that have occurred before, most of the decline in exports and imports we’ve seen 
is due to less intense trade rather than firm and firm-product exit.  To the extent that this is true, 
trade will bounce back relatively quickly once conditions improve.  It is of course possible that 
the severe shortage of credit available to firms over the past year has led to a higher-than usual 
share of harder-to-reverse firm exit, potentially dampening the speed of recovery”.  
As indicated by Schott, if there are significant fixed costs associated with exporting or 
importing new products, then identifying whether most of the changes in trade were on the 
                                                            
2The intensive margin refers to changes in the value of exports due to changes in the quantities and/or prices of 
already exported goods. The extensive margin refers to changes in the value of exports due to changes in the number 
of goods exported and/or changes in the number of destinations to which a country exports old or new goods.  
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intensive margin is useful in predicting the speed of the recovery.  There has also been 
substantial interest in identifying the role of demand shocks versus supply shocks in explaining 
the largest collapse in world trade since the 1930s.  Supporters of the demand shock hypothesis 
argue that the collapse in trade has been the result of a synchronized postponement of purchases, 
especially of durable consumer and investment products. By contrast, supporters of the supply 
shock hypothesis suggest that the collapse in trade has been a consequence of the sudden 
financial arrest, which froze global credit markets and spilled over on the specialized financial 
instruments that finance international trade.  
In this paper, we identify a new set of stylized facts on the 2008-2009 trade collapse that 
we hope can be used to shed light on the importance of demand and supply-side factors in 
explaining the fall in trade.  In particular, we decompose the fall in international trade into 
product entry and exit, price changes, and quantity changes for imports by Brazil, the European 
Union, Indonesia, and the United States.   To our knowledge, this is the first paper to decompose 
the trade collapse at the product level into changes in prices and quantities, as well as entry and 
exit.  Our approach is inspired by earlier work analyzing the 1997 Asian crisis by Bernard, 
Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009).  However, we go one step further: we decompose the 
observed changes in trade at the intensive margin into price and quantity changes. 
Our ability to identify what happened to traded prices and quantities between 2008 and 
2009 allows us to suggest a new way of identifying the importance of demand versus supply 
factors in contributing to the observed fall in trade.  We would expect that if the decline in trade 
was mostly driven by a negative demand shock, then both prices and quantities would be 
negatively affected.  However, if supply side shocks were important, with a reduction in trade 
credit leading to a reduction in supply of traded goods independently of the negative demand 
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shock, then we would have expected less downward pressure, and possibly upward pressure, on 
prices. 
When we aggregate across all products, most of the countries analyzed experienced a fall 
in new products, an increase in product exit, and falls in quantity for product lines that continued 
to be traded. Whereas the overall price effect is negative in the US, EU and Indonesia, it is 
positive in Brazil. These effects are similar for high-income and middle-income partner 
countries, but trade with low-income partner countries was much less affected. Trade with upper-
middle income exporters appears to have suffered the most. Overall, the most value was lost 
through a reduction in value of products that continued to be traded, although potential value was 
also lost as more products exited and fewer products entered. This evidence that the intensive 
rather than extensive margins mattered the most matches previous evidence on the 1997 Asian 
crisis (Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott 2009).  Across all products, both prices and 
quantities fell significantly in the US and EU, which is consistent with a story where the demand 
shock played a dominant role.  Aggregating across all product categories, the evidence is 
consistent with the conclusions reached by Eaton et al (2010) and Levchenko et al (2010), who 
argue that the collapse in trade was caused primarily by a synchronized demand-side shock.   
However, these average effects mask significant differences across product types.  
Disaggregating the data into manufactures and non-manufactures, we show that the price 
declines are driven primarily by commodities.  Within manufacturing,  while most quantity 
changes were negative, in most cases price changes moved in the opposite direction.  This is 
particularly true for products imported by developing-country trading partners.  Consequently, 
within manufacturing, there is some evidence consistent with the possibility that supply side 
frictions did play a role.     
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Considerable differences emerge across product types and exporter income levels. Some 
have argued that South-South trade was less disrupted during the crisis.  While this appears to be 
the case if one examines aggregate trade patterns across all goods, there is a large decline in 
manufacturing trade with Sub-Saharan Africa.  We indeed find a small positive quantity effect 
for total exports from low-income countries to Brazil and Indonesia, but there is an almost 
equally large negative net entry effect. Furthermore, the quantity effect for manufactures alone is 
negative.  We also find evidence consistent with the view that credit constraints could account 
for the price increases which occurred in the manufacturing sector.  For the United States, for 
example, price increases were most significant in sectors which are typically credit constrained.  
In Section II, we describe the conceptual approach.  Results are presented in Section III, 
and Section IV concludes.  We focus on the decomposition of changes in trade into entry, exit, 
price and quantity changes.  Our ability to separate price and quantity changes allows us to 
identify the upward trajectory of prices for manufacturing, which could be consistent with a role 
for credit constraints in explaining some—but obviously not the majority—of the collapse in 
world trade. 
 
2. Conceptual Approach 
 
Our approach is inspired by earlier work analyzing the 1997 Asian crisis by Bernard, 
Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009).  However, we go one step further: we decompose the 
observed changes in trade at the intensive margin into price and quantity changes.  For each 
importing country, we can tabulate the total number of products that entered or exited or 
continued in the market for imports from a given partner country. Most products fall into the 
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“continuing” category, for which we can assign further divisions. For each continuing product, 
we can decompose the change in value from one year to the next into price and quantity margins. 
If the data are missing for one of the years, we do not assign a status.  
Together, these classifications allow us to analyze whether the fall in trade values 
worldwide was a result of changing extensive margins (fewer products entering, more products 
exiting) or intensive margins (falling quantities, falling prices, or some combination thereof).  
Specifically, our main decomposition is as follows. At time ݐ, we can write total value as 
the sum of the value ݒ of each product ݅, which is the product of price ݌ and quantity ݍ: (1) 
ݒ௧ ൌ෍݌௧௜ݍ௧௜
ூ
௜ୀଵ
 
Then the change in total value from period t-1 to period t can be written as follows: (2) 
݀ݒ௧ ൌ ݒ௧ െ ݒ௧ିଵ ൌ෍݌௧௜ݍ௧௜
ூ
௜ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௜ ݍ௧ିଵ௜
ூ
௜ୀଵ
 
This can be decomposed into products that are traded in both t and t-1 (denoted c for continuing), 
only in t (denoted n for entry), or only in t-1 (denoted x for exit):    (3) 
݀ݒ௧ ൌ෍݌௧௖ݍ௧௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௖ ݍ௧ିଵ௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
൅෍݌௧௡ݍ௧௡
ே
௡ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௡ ݍ௧ିଵ௡ ൅
ே
௡ୀଵ
෍݌௧௫ݍ௧௫
௑
௫ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௫ ݍ௧ିଵ௫
௑
௫ୀଵ
 
Where ݒ௧ିଵ௡ ൌ 0 and ݒ௧௫ ൌ 0:         (4) 
݀ݒ௧ ൌ෍݌௧௖ݍ௧௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௖ ݍ௧ିଵ௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
൅෍݌௧௡ݍ௧௡
ே
௡ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௫ ݍ௧ିଵ௫
௑
௫ୀଵ
 
To separate the price and quantity effects, we add and subtract ∑ ݌௧௜ݍ௧ିଵ௜ூ௜ୀଵ   for the continuing 
products:           (5) 
݀ݒ௧ ൌ෍݌௧௖ݍ௧௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
൅෍݌௧௖ݍ௧ିଵ௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧௖ݍ௧ିଵ௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௖ ݍ௧ିଵ௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
൅෍݌௧௡ݍ௧௡
ே
௡ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௫ ݍ௧ିଵ௫
௑
௫ୀଵ
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Rearranging we get:          (6) 
݀ݒ௧ ൌ෍݌௧௖∆ݍ௧௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
൅෍∆݌௧௖ݍ௧ିଵ௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
൅෍݌௧௡ݍ௧௡
ே
௡ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௫ ݍ௧ିଵ௫
௑
௫ୀଵ
 
Note that had we added and subtracted  ∑ ݌௧ିଵ௜ ݍ௧௜ூ௜ୀଵ  we would instead obtain:  (7) 
݀ݒ௧ ൌ෍݌௧ିଵ௖ ∆ݍ௧௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
൅෍∆݌௧௖ݍ௧௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
൅෍݌௧௡ݍ௧௡
ே
௡ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௫ ݍ௧ିଵ௫
௑
௫ୀଵ
 
Or that we could use the average of these two:      (8) 
݀ݒ௧ ൌ෍݌௧
௖ ൅ ݌௧ିଵ௖
2 ∆ݍ௧
௖
஼
௖ୀଵ
൅෍∆݌௧௖ ݍ௧
௖ ൅ ݍ௧ିଵ௖
2
஼
௖ୀଵ
൅෍݌௧௡ݍ௧௡
ே
௡ୀଵ
െ෍݌௧ିଵ௫ ݍ௧ିଵ௫
௑
௫ୀଵ
 
Thus any of the last three equations gives us that the total change in value is the sum of the 
quantity effect, the price effect, the new product effect, and the exiting product effect, i.e., the 
sum of the intensive and extensive margins. Then the percentage change can be found as  
follows:           (9) 
݀ݒ௧
ݒ௧ିଵ ൌ
∑ ௣೟೎ା௣೟షభ೎ଶ ∆ݍ௧௖஼௖ୀଵ
ݒ௧ିଵ ൅
∑ ∆݌௧௖௤೟೎ା௤೟షభ೎ଶ஼௖ୀଵ
ݒ௧ିଵ ൅
∑ ݌௧௡ݍ௧௡ே௡ୀଵ
ݒ௧ିଵ െ
∑ ݌௧ିଵ௫ ݍ௧ିଵ௫௑௫ୀଵ
ݒ௧ିଵ  
And if we want to know whether these effects are driven by the number of products or the 
average value of each product, we can write:       (10) 
݀ݒ௧
ݒ௧ିଵ ൌ ܥ כ
∑ ௣೟೎ା௣೟షభ೎ଶ ∆ݍ௧௖஼௖ୀଵ
ܥ כ ݒ௧ିଵ ൅ ܥ כ
∑ ∆݌௧௖௤೟೎ା௤೟షభ೎ଶ஼௖ୀଵ
ܥ כ ݒ௧ିଵ ൅ ܰ כ
∑ ݌௧௡ݍ௧௡ே௡ୀଵ
ܰ כ ݒ௧ିଵ െ ܺ כ
∑ ݌௧ିଵ௫ ݍ௧ିଵ௫௑௫ୀଵ
ܺ כ ݒ௧ିଵ  
Thus the total change in value is the sum of the average quantity effect, the average price effect, 
the average new product effect, and the average exiting product effect, each weighted by the 
number of products. 
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3. Results  
 
We analyze imports from all partner countries for the United States, Brazil, Indonesia, 
and each member of the European Union. We observe, for all traded products, value and 
quantity, from which we calculate unit-values. The data are disaggregated at the 6-digit product 
level by both importing and exporting countries. Observations are available by month from 
January 2007 to November 2009. The data are available in US dollars for the US, Brazil, and 
Indonesia and in Euros for the EU. The choice of currency used in this analysis is important, as 
both real and nominal exchange rates fluctuated sharply during the crisis. In particular, the dollar 
appreciated substantially against the currencies of most major trading partners, with the 
exceptions of Japan and China. The currencies of Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Hungary, Poland, and 
Ukraine depreciated more than 50 percent against the dollar, although they saw some recovery 
after the beginning of 2009 (CEA 2010). Figures 1a and 1b show real and nominal exchange 
rates of the euro, Brazilian real, and Indonesian rupiah against the US dollar. 3 
As our analysis focuses on imports, we deflate using the importer countries’ Consumer 
Price Indices (which are available monthly, unlike GDP deflators or trade-weighted deflators). In 
the future, we hope to use a combination of importer country and exporter country CPIs. Final 
results are normalized to US dollars (at September of 2009 exchange rates). Note that real 
exchange rates fluctuated even within the European Union, so we use country-specific CPIs there 
as well (except in figures 1a and 1b, which uses a EU27-wide CPI). Nominal exchange rates and 
                                                            
3 For illustrative purposes, consider the real exchange rates in March 2008 and March 2009, when the 
euro rose against the dollar approximately 18%, the real approximately 27%, and the rupiah 
approximately 16% (all in real terms). Suppose that the US saw a drop in trade during that period from 
100 real dollars to 70 real dollars, or 30%. This same drop would be just 18% in real euros, 11% in real 
reais, and 19% in real rupiahs; one’s choice of currency matters during the crisis. 
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CPI data are taken from Eurostat for the EU countries and from Global Financial Data for Brazil 
and Indonesia. CPI data for the US is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Very rarely, observations on value are missing. More commonly, data on quantity are 
missing. Both, of course, affect our ability to calculate unit-values. The US, EU, and Brazil all 
report a main quantity variable and a supplemental quantity variable. We use the main quantity 
variable where possible, and the supplemental quantity variable where the main measure is not 
reported.  
To maximize data reliability, only trade as reported by the importer country is used.  
European Union import data are collected by Eurostat and was obtained through Tradewatch. 
United States data are from the US International Trade Commission (USITC) and was also 
obtained through Tradewatch. Brazilian data was obtained from the Ministry of Development, 
Industry, and International Trade (MDIC), and Indonesian data from BPS-Statistics Indonesia 
(BPS). For all four datasets, monthly data was aggregated into quarters. 8-digit and 10-digit tariff 
line data are aggregated into 6-digit Harmonized System product codes. All four datasets report 
trade with both other nations and some territories (e.g. Taiwan, Guam, etc.). Generally we report 
results with these territories included in the data as separate units of observation. An exception is 
the section on partner income, where we only include nations and a few large territories (e.g. 
Taiwan). Territories represent a very small fraction of world trade, and accordingly should not 
influence the results. 
To analyze product entry and exit, we tabulate whether products were traded for a 
bilateral country-pair in a given period. For instance, we assign one “point” in the first quarter of 
2007 to the United States for its imports from Germany of product # 520829 (Woven fabrics of 
cotton, containing 85 percent or more by weight of cotton, weighing not more than 200 g/m2: 
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Other fabrics). We again assign one “point” in the first quarter of 2008, as product # 520829 was 
again imported by the United States from Germany. 
Before turning to the decomposition, we examine the changes in the extensive and 
intensive margins. This is presented in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows the fall in bilaterally 
traded products at the beginning of the global economic crisis. There is a drop in the total 
number of bilaterally-traded products for Brazil, Indonesia, and the US, all beginning in October 
2008; however there is no fall for the European Union. The percentage fall in the total number of 
products is greatest for Brazil and Indonesia, reaching about 10 percent from peak to trough for 
both countries.  By contrast, there is no decline in the percentage of products traded for the EU 
and the decline for the United States is half of that for Brazil and Indonesia, around 5 percent. 
Figure 3 shows the values for the US, Brazil, Indonesia, and the average across the 
European Union. Each shows a sharp drop in total value of imports beginning in October 2008, 
with recovery beginning in early 2009. None was back to pre-crisis levels by the end of the 
period shown (September 2009).   It is also important to note the much greater volatility 
experienced by the developing countries.  The total value of imports fell by nearly half for Brazil 
and Indonesia, before beginning to recover.  At the end of the sample period, however, the total 
loss in trade was about the same for both groups of countries, around one third to one fourth of 
aggregate trade.  Since the sample ends in September 2009, the trends do not capture the 
continued slow recovery since that period. 
Our decomposition is carried out in six-month periods; annual data are too aggregated as 
it cuts across pre-crisis and crisis months. To eliminate problems with seasonal exports, we count 
whether products are “entering” or “continuing” according to their status from the first half of 
year t to the first half of year t+1. For instance, product # 520829 is considered “continuing” in 
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2008 since it was traded in the first six months of 2007. A product that was not traded in 
January-June of 2007 but was in January-June of 2008 is counted as “entering.” Similarly, a 
product that is traded in January-June 2007 but not January-June 2008 is counted as “exiting.” 
All of these classifications are assigned at the country level; if a product were imported one year 
only from Germany and the next year only from Italy, it would be counted as exiting from 
Germany and entering Italy.  
Table 1 and figure 4 show the results for the decomposition. To simplify the table, we 
aggregate the United States and the EU into one group, and Brazil and Indonesia into a separate 
group.4 In this table we use the decomposition as it appears in equation (10).5 That is, in 
calculating the quantity effect, we use the average of prices in the two periods (and similarly the 
average of quantities for the price effect). We eliminate observations on price and quantity where 
using this average, rather than one period’s price or the other’s, would make a substantial 
difference. These observations are not dropped; rather they are absorbed by the category 
“continuing products, price and quantity unobserved.” This category also includes products 
which simply did not have a price and quantity recorded.  
The EU and US together lost over 1 trillion dollars in imports from the first half of 2008 
to the first half of 2009, or 25.2 percent. Both table 1 and figure 4 make clear that the effects 
along the intensive margin dramatically outweighed the effects along the extensive margin, both 
in the US-EU markets and in the Brazil-Indonesia markets. The reduction in quantity was largest, 
and it accounted for over 63% of the total value change in the US and EU. The decline in prices 
                                                            
4 Results for the individual countries are available upon request. In addition, we perform the analysis both for the 
European Union as a whole and for individual countries. Finally, we consider both European Union trade with all 
partners, and EU trade exclusively with extra-EU partners. The results shown in Table 1 are qualitatively similar for 
the EU as a whole versus Germany, and for all partners versus extra-EU partners only. These are available upon 
request. 
5 Note that, as we report the number of products and the average value of each product, the results can easily be 
converted to match equations (8) or (9). In subsequent tables, we present results following equation (9), which can 
again be converted to match equation (8). 
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accounted for approximately 22% in the US and EU. Net entry, the sum of the new product (-
6.5%) and exiting product (8.9%) contributions, contributed to only 2.4% of the total value 
change.  
Brazil and Indonesia together lost over 25 billion dollars in imports from the first half of 
2008 to the first half of 2009, or 18.9%. The effects along the intensive margins again 
dominated, with the quantity effect again largest. Indeed, the fall in quantity contributed to 
almost all of the total value change. The price effect was actually positive, partially outweighing 
the value lost from the quantity effect.  Negative net entry accounted for 5.3% of the total value 
change, over twice as high as the net entry effect in the US and EU. These higher entry and exit 
rates are consistent with the higher volatility in trade changes documented in Table 1. The results 
for the intensive and extensive margins match evidence by Bricongne et al (2009), who find that 
for French firms, changes in the intensive margin outweighed changes in the extensive margin.6    
 
3.1 Aggregate Results 
 
The main decomposition can also be used in an OLS (ordinary least squares) linear 
regression.  We extend Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009) to allow a decomposition of 
the intensive margin into price and quantity effects.  From equation (8), we show that the change 
in value is the sum of the change along four margins: price, quantity, entry, and exit. This is also 
true for each individual trading partner. We can then regress each margin of trade on the total 
change in trade, where the unit of observation is a trading partner. Since equation (8) is an 
                                                            
6 We also analyze entry and exit compared to entry and exit in previous time periods. We find that product entry 
declined during the crisis, and product exiting rose. This was generally true across countries. Available upon 
request. 
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identity, and OLS has mean-zero residuals, the coefficients from the four equations will sum to 
unity. Each coefficient then represents the average contribution (across trading partners) of the 
given margin to the total change in value from the first half of 2008 to the first half of 2009. 
Table 2 shows the results for this regression decomposition. As we indicated in the 
introduction, the stylized facts are very different for all goods (which include commodities) and 
manufactures only.  Consequently, in the first four columns of Table 2 we report the results for 
all goods, while in the last four columns we report the results for manufacturing only.  Note that 
the total value change is negative for all columns except Brazilian imports of manufactures 
(which rose 4%). Hence in all other columns, a fall in prices or quantities is represented by a 
positive percentage of the value change, whereas in the manufactures-Brazil column, the fall in 
quantities is represented by a negative percentage of the total value change. Across all goods, the 
evidence is qualitatively similar to Table 1, but with some differences (arising from the fact that 
the regression averages across trading partners).  For the United States, the results in column 1 
suggest that price declines accounted for 36 percent of the reduction in trade across all trading 
partners, while a decline in quantity accounted for 57 percent.  The contribution of entry and exit 
accounted for less than 1 percent of the observed changes.  In both the EU and Indonesia, the 
quantity declines dominated the price effect, while for Brazil the opposite is true.  For all 
countries, the intensive margin again is substantially larger than the extensive margin. Exit again 
outweighs entry, leading to negative net entry in all regions.   
Across all goods, the evidence is consistent with both quantity and price declines.  
Without disaggregating the sample, the evidence is consistent with a pure demand shock story: a 
fall in demand generated both declines in prices and quantities.  However, if we restrict the 
sample to manufacturing, as we do in the last four columns, a different story emerges.  We see 
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that for manufactures, the fall in quantity continues to account for the major share of the 
observed trade collapse in the US, EU, and Indonesia. In Brazil, the value of manufactured 
imports increased in this time period despite a large negative quantity effect. All four regions 
saw positive price effects. For the US, EU, and Indonesia, these were small and did little to offset 
the fall in quantity. However, for Brazil the price increase was large enough to offset the 
contribution of declining quantities to the fall in trade.  All in all, the evidence is consistent with 
a more important role played by supply side disruptions, possibly caused by a contraction in 
trade credit in manufacturing, particularly in Brazil. 
 Additionally, the regression technique easily allows us to identify outliers. For instance, 
OPEC countries experienced larger price effects for their exports to the US than did other 
countries, as the graph below shows. Figure 5a shows the fitted values of the price (grey) and 
quantity (black) effects, as well as actual data points for individual countries.  Actual dollar 
amounts in terms of declines in billions of dollars following the crisis are shown on the 
horizontal axis.  Figure 5b shows the same data, with a close-up excluding the largest countries. 
The y-axis displays the total change in the value, and the x-axis the price and quantity effects. 
Oil-exporting countries, including Saudia Arabia and Venezuela (visible in Figure 5a) 
and Iraq, Algeria, Angola, and Russia (visible in Figure 5b) show price effects that are larger 
(more negative) than the average. Their quantity effects are, correspondingly, smaller than the 
average. Other large trading partners, such as Japan and Germany (visible in Figure 5a) and the 
UK, Malaysia, Italy, France, Korea, and Taiwan (in 5b) show larger quantity effects than the 
average across countries.  
Alternatively, we can decompose the total trade value (and change in total trade value) by 
trading partner, product, and average value, following Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott 
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(2009). The total trade imports by country ݔ at time ݐ is the product of the number of partner 
countries (ݕ௧ሻ, the number of traded products ݅௧, the density of trade ݀௧, and the average value of 
trade ݒ௧ഥ : ݒ௧ ൌ ݕ௧݅௧݀௧ݒ௧ഥ . The density of trade is defined as the ratio of the number of traded 
country/product pairs to the number of “potential” country/product pairs: ݀௧ ൌ ݋௧ ሺݕ௧݅௧ሻ⁄  where 
݋௧ is the number of country/product pairs with positive value. The average value ݒ௧ഥ  is conditional 
on the country/product pair being traded. 
Results for this alternative decomposition (in table 3) show that, while the extensive 
margin experienced negative changes, the intensive margin mattered more. No country saw an 
increase in the number of trading partners from 2008 to 2009, and Brazil in fact lost almost 10 
trading partners. All four regions also saw a fall in the number of products traded, although this 
was a very small percentage of the total loss. The largest changes were in average value, which 
fell by 10% to 28% across the various regions. 
 
3.2 Heterogeneity and Mechanisms 
 
The decompositions given above aggregate across trading partners, product types, and 
shipment methods, and as such they mask considerable heterogeneity. We expect to see, given 
the hypothesized mechanisms for the transmission of the trade collapse, differences across these 
dimensions. While the financial crisis originated in high income countries, its effects on trade 
were rapidly transmitted to low-income countries. It has been hypothesized that the effects of 
constrained trade finance could vary by exporter income (Malouche 2009, Berman and Martin 
2010) and by geographic region (Berman and Martin 2010). High-income countries with well-
developed markets were most affected in the financial crisis; on the other hand, low-income 
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exporters with less developed financial markets may be more reliant on trade finance originating 
in their trading partners. 
Countries with different levels of income export different baskets of goods, which 
embody different levels of quality and variety. To analyze how the response in trade volumes 
changes with the income level of the exporting country, we decompose the fall in trade in 
different groups. In doing so, we classify trading partners in four categories: high, upper middle, 
lower middle, and low income, according to the World Bank’s country classification.7 Table 4 
and figure 6 present the main decomposition along these income definitions. 
Overall, upper middle income exporters were most affected by the crisis, with falls of 
31% to the EU and US and 30% to Brazil and Indonesia. In terms of total volume, high income 
partners lost the most. From the first half of 2008 to the first half of 2009, exports from these 
countries to the EU and US fell from 2.8 trillion to 2.1 trillion dollars. In the US and EU, 
quantity effects again dominate price effects. This is particularly true for high-income trading 
partners and low-income trading partners; the price effect is actually positive for the latter. In 
Brazil and Indonesia, negative quantity effects again dominate, with positive price effects for 
high-income and lower-middle income trading partners and negative price effects for the other 
partners. This may be driven by the type of products exported by these countries (which we 
analyze in a later section). A notable exception is in exports from low-income countries to Brazil 
and Indonesia. Here we actually see a small positive quantity effect. This effect on its own 
matches anecdotal evidence that South-South trade was less disrupted during the crisis, but it 
must be contrasted with the large effect of product exits.  
Among the most salient results is the small change in value for low-income trading 
partners; imports from these countries fell by only 4% in the US and EU and 7% in Brazil and 
                                                            
7 Groupings are given in Appendix A. 
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Indonesia. Also notable in these countries is the large amount of product churning; the extensive 
margins are much larger than for any other trading partners. Also of interest, the extensive 
margin (entry and exit) varies considerably across trading partners. While entry and exit roughly 
cancel each other in high income exports to the US and EU, entry outweighed exit in the upper 
middle income partners, and exit substantially outweighed entry in the lower middle income 
partners. For exports to Brazil and Indonesia, exit outweighs entry for upper middle income, 
lower middle income, and low income countries.  
It is not clear from the above decomposition to what extent differences across country 
income levels is driven by the types of products exported as opposed to macroeconomic 
conditions. Accordingly, we also analyze differences across product types. We aggregate across 
product sections, a higher level of aggregation than HS-2. A description of this aggregation is 
given in Appendix B. For simplicity we consider only imports by the US. Results are shown in 
Table 5. 
The results in Table 5 (shown for the United States) confirm the trends identified earlier, 
where we contrasted the sharp price declines for commodities and the price increases for 
manufactures. In Table 5, we can identify these different effects by product category.  The 
largest total value change is in minerals, which saw a fall of 134 billion dollars. Almost ninety 
percent of that decline was due to fall in the price, with very little of the effect due to reductions 
in quantity.  Machinery/electrical equipment and transportation equipment also saw large falls in 
total volume, but almost all of the changes were due to a decline in quantity.  Prices increased in 
the following product categories: chemicals, footwear, leather, miscellaneous, and transportation 
equipment (note that because the total value change is negative, a positive total price effect is 
represented by a negative percentage of the value change). All products saw falls in quantity, 
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with the quantity effect generally contributing to over half of the total effect. The quantity effect 
was only relatively small for minerals, where the price effect was largest. Most of the large 
negative price effects were in product categories made up largely of commodities (animal 
products, minerals, vegetable products). In light of the very different behavior of prices for 
manufactures and commodities following the trade collapse, for the rest of this paper we separate 
commodities versus manufactures. 
Using the Rauch (1999) classification of product diversification, we separately analyze 
homogenous goods and price-referenced goods (commodities) and differentiated goods 
(manufactures). We perform the same decomposition as before, analyzing the importance of 
quantity, price, and entry and exit changes to the overall change in aggregate trade.  Results are 
shown in table 6 and figure 7.  
The difference across product classes is striking. The negative price effect, which 
contributed 22% of the total fall in the US and EU shown in Table 1, is apparent for homogenous 
goods (commodities) but not for differentiated goods (manufactures). While the price effect 
accounted for 90% of the total fall in value for homogenous commodity exports to the US and 
73% to the EU, it actually rose for differentiated goods to both the US and EU. The price effect 
was also positive for manufactures exported to Brazil and Indonesia, and for Brazil it was larger 
than the negative quantity effect. We know that commodity prices fell during the crisis, and that 
this was the burst of the pre-crisis bubble. It is thus not surprising that the price effect was large 
for commodities; it is, however, noteworthy that the price effect was mostly contained to 
commodities. Since we know that demand for manufactures fell during the crisis, the effect on 
prices can tell us something about what happened to supply. Where prices rose or where they fell 
only slightly, it is plausible that supply shifted in. Where prices fell more, it is more plausible 
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that supply stayed constant or shifted out. Thus the evidence on manufactures, contrasted with 
commodities and particularly in the case of Brazil and Indonesia, points to a negative supply 
shock in manufactures in addition to the negative demand shock. This negative supply shock 
could be from reductions in trade finance or from the fragmentation of the global supply chain. 
We then further disaggregate the above changes by both shipment method and product 
section. For simplicity, we present a graph showing the various margins; tables are available 
upon request. Figure 8 summarizes the changes in quantities and prices both by product as well 
as by shipment type.  Shipment types include shipment by sea and air.  As Figure 8 illustrates, 
there are not significant differences in trade responses across the mode of transport.  However, 
the major differences are for manufactures versus commodities.  Commodities exhibited both 
price and quantity declines, as indicated by both the dark and light bars locating on the left hand 
side of the graph for minerals, stone and glass, animal products, and vegetables.  In contrast, 
manufactures showed quantity declines but mild price increases.  The overall trends in Figure 9 
are consistent with an overall pattern of demand contraction, with some evidence of supply 
constraints in manufacturing.  The largest price increases were in the leather and footwear sector, 
where credit constraints and trade frictions may have restricted supply. 
For each product section, we also show the changes in value transported by air versus by 
sea. For many products, the quantity effect is larger by air, excepting chemicals, foodstuffs, and 
transportation equipment. Our story can be further elaborated by returning to the heterogeneity 
across trading partner income, but restricting the sample to manufactures (table 7).  We 
additionally consider China and Sub-Saharan Africa, two regions where researchers have 
hypothesized that the trade fall was unique. As mentioned above, it has been theorized that the 
trade finance constraint could have been either much more severe or much less severe in Sub-
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Saharan Africa. China has been unique both for its more rapid recovery and because it has been a 
target for protectionism (Bown 2009). 
For all four income levels, and for both China and Sub-Saharan Africa, quantity effects 
were large and negative. This is not surprising; the demand effect hit all countries. The price 
effect is positive for all regions, with the exception of exports from Sub-Saharan Africa to the 
US and the EU. The consistent positive association between price changes is striking.   
 
3.3 Evidence on Credit Constraints and Trade Collapse 
 
 This section presents the only direct evidence linking credit constraints with upward 
pressure on manufacturing prices during the crisis. We adopt the classification scheme of 
Bricongne et al (2009) to separate products according to sectoral dependence on external finance. 
The Bricongne et al index is based on recent firm data from France and combines two variables: 
cash flow over value (as a proxy for self-financing capacity) and financial charges over turnover 
(as a proxy for dependence on external finance). Accordingly, we separate all products into two 
categories: high dependence on external finance (taking a value of 6 to 10 in the index) and low 
dependence (a value of 2 to 5). Table 8 presents the results by importing country/region of the 
OLS regression decomposition, which allows us to test the hypothesis that the two types of 
product were affected equally by the crisis. As before, we restrict our analysis to manufactures.  
 Here we see striking evidence that the positive price effect in the United States was more 
pronounced for sectors with high dependence on external finance. This evidence on the price 
effect is crucial: at first glance, one sees that overall value fell more in sectors with low 
dependence on external finance. However, the separation into price and quantity effects reveals 
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that this was due to more significant positive price pressure in the high-dependence sectors. The 
European Union does not show this effect. For Brazil, overall value fell for the finance-
dependent sectors but rose for the low-dependence sectors.  Overall value also fell more for 
finance-dependent sectors in Indonesian imports. 
Unfortunately, our data do not allows us to separate general financial constraints from 
those specific to trade. However, we do see clear evidence that finance-dependent sectors in the 
United States, the epicenter of the financial crisis, experienced more significant upward price 
pressure, indicative of supply-side constraints. 
 
3.4 Evidence using a longer time series 
 
Next we examine whether these findings are unique to the crisis, or whether they 
represent the continuation of historical trends. Figures 9 through 12 show the timing of the 
collapse in trade by the Rauch classification. Figure 9 shows entry, exit, net entry and total 
product counts for US imports and Figure 10 for Indonesian imports. Figures 9 and 10 clearly 
show that negative net entry begins between Q3 2008 and Q4 2008, just as the crisis was 
breaking. Furthermore, the negative net entry is a result of both more products exiting and fewer 
products entering, relative to before the crisis.  
In Figures 11 and 12 we perform the same decomposition as before, but on a quarterly 
basis, using data from Q1 2007 to Q3 2009. Entry, exit, price changes, and quantity changes are 
now defined relative to the previous quarter, rather than the same quarter of the previous year. 
Hence the magnitudes of these changes will not match the magnitudes given in the other tables, 
but they do show the specific timing of the collapse in trade. Figures 11 and 12 plot the value of 
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each margin across time, with the vertical axis showing values in billions of US dollars. It is 
clear from the upper left quadrants that, for both US and Indonesian imports, the fall in value 
begins in Q3 2008, as the economic crisis was beginning. Furthermore, this is true for both price 
and quantity effects. Figure 11 shows the dollar values for each margin for US imports and 
Figure 12 for Indonesian imports. For all three types of goods, value drops off beginning in Q3 
2008. For differentiated goods, the fall is almost entirely composed of the quantity effect. For 
reference priced goods, the value change is a combination of quantity and price effects. For 
homogenous goods, the fall in US imports is almost entirely a price effect, whereas for 
Indonesian imports there are negative price and quantity effects. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
  
In this paper, we identify a new set of stylized facts on the 2008-2009 trade collapse that 
we hope can be used to shed light on the importance of demand and supply-side factors in 
explaining the fall in trade.  In particular, we decompose the fall in international trade into 
product entry and exit, price changes, and quantity changes for imports by Brazil, the European 
Union, Indonesia, and the United States. When we aggregate across all products, most of the 
countries analyzed experienced a decline in new products, a rise in product exit, and falls in 
quantity for product lines that continued to be traded. These effects are similar for high-income 
and middle-income partner countries, but trade with low-income partner countries was much less 
affected.  
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The evidence suggests that the intensive rather than extensive margin mattered the most, 
consistent with studies of other countries and previous recessionary periods.  On average, 
quantities declined and prices fell. This was true for imports by Brazil, the European Union, 
Indonesia, and the United States. In the EU and US, net entry accounted for a loss of 24 billion 
dollars, the price effect accounted for a loss of 220 billion dollars, and the quantity effect 642 
billion dollars. In Brazil and Indonesia, net entry accounted for 1 billion and the quantity effect 
25 billion dollars; a positive price effect partially offset this by 3 billion.  
 However, these average effects mask enormous differences across different product 
types.  Price declines were driven primarily by commodities.  Within manufacturing, while most 
quantity changes were negative, in most cases price changes moved in the opposite direction.  
This is particularly true for products imported by developing-country trading partners.  
Consequently, within manufacturing, there is some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
supply side frictions played a role.    For the United States, for example, price increases were 
most significant in sectors which are typically credit constrained.  
There were also considerable differences across trading partners and shipment methods. 
Nevertheless, the consistency of quantity declines suggests that by far the largest contributor to 
the crisis was the demand shock. Yet within manufacturing, there is also systematic evidence 
consistent with some negative supply shocks, as there were price increases associated with 
quantity declines for the United States, the European Union, Brazil, and Indonesia. Generally 
only commodities saw a fall in prices, as the pre-crisis commodity bubble burst. The evidence 
pointing to supply shocks is most pronounced for sectors dependent on external finance in the 
US. 
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A large number of open questions remain regarding the falls in trade during the 2009 
global economic crisis. It is our hope that the descriptive evidence presented in this paper will 
help guide research questions moving forward. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4: Decomposition Along Extensive (Entry and Exit) and Intensive (Price and 
Quantity) Margins, Imports before and after the Global Economic Crisis 
 
Notes: each margin is shown as a percentage of the value in 2008. For details, see table 1. 
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Figure 5a: Price and Quantity Effects, by US Trading Partners, Billions of US$ 
 
 
Figure 5b: Price and Quantity Effects, by US Trading Partners, Billions of US$, Close-up 
View 
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Figure 6: Heterogeneity across Exporter Income 
 
Notes: each margin is shown as a percentage of the value in 2008. For details, see table 4. 
 
Figure 7: Heterogeneity in Commodities (homogeneous) versus Manufactures 
(differentiated) 
   
Notes: each margin is shown as a percentage of the value in 2008. For details, see table 6. 
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Figure 8: Heterogeneity across Product Types and Shipment Methods (US Imports) 
Changes in Import Values as a Percentage of Value in 2008, by Margin 
 
Notes: Within each product grouping (e.g. animal products), the upper bar shows the effect on air shipments and the 
lower bar shows the effect on vessel shipments. The effects are percentage changes of the total effect within that 
shipment type. For instance, the price effect for animal products shipped by sea is divided by the total value in 2008 
of animal products shipped by sea. Note that typically sea shipments were much larger in 2008, so the gross value 
changes for sea shipments are larger compared to those for air shipments than what is shown above. Entry and exit 
are not shown and represent less than 5% of the change in any given category. Continuing products with unobserved 
price and/or quantity are also not shown. 
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Figure 9: Product-by-Country Counts, US Imports 
Vertical axis: number of product-by-country Imports 
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Figure 10: Product-by-Country Counts, Indonesian Imports 
Vertical axis: number of product-by-country Imports 
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Figure 11: Intensive and Extensive Margins: Changes in Value, US Imports 
Vertical Axis: Billions of US$ 
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Figure 12: Intensive and Extensive Margins: Changes in Value, Indonesian Imports 
Vertical Axis: Billions of US$ 
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Table 1: Decomposition Along Extensive (Entry and Exit) and Intensive (Price and 
Quantity) Margins, Imports before and after the Global Economic Crisis 
  number 
average 
value 
change, 
millions 
of US$ 
total 
value 
change, 
billions 
of US$ 
% of 
value in 
2008 
% of 
value 
change 
UNITED STATES & 
EUROPEAN UNION 
new products 383975 0.17 65.77 1.6 -6.5 
exiting products 434448 -0.21 -90.00 -2.2 8.9 
price effect 881780 -0.25 -219.79 -5.5 21.6 
quantity effect 881780 -0.73 -642.43 -15.9 63.3 
contin. prod., p and q unobs. 538289 -0.24 -128.80 -3.2 12.7 
Total -1015.25 -25.2 100.0 
BRAZIL & INDONESIA 
new products 22626 0.21 4.75 3.5 -18.7 
exiting products 27219 -0.22 -6.09 -4.5 24.0 
price effect 59253 0.06 3.33 2.5 -13.1 
quantity effect 59253 -0.42 -24.95 -18.5 98.4 
contin. prod., p and q unobs. 18126 -0.13 -2.41 -1.8 9.5 
Total -25.36 -18.9 100.0 
Notes: The time period represented is from the first half of 2008 (pre-crisis) to the first half of 
2009 (mid-crisis). To avoid issues with seasonally-traded products, we do not include the second 
half of 2008. The final row for each region shows the value change for continuing products for 
which we are unable to observe either price or quantity. 
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Table 2: OLS Regression Decomposition of the Change in Imports across Trading 
Partners, Before and During the Global Economic Crisis 
All products Manufactures only 
  US EU Brazil 
Indo-
nesia US EU Brazil 
Indo-
nesia 
new products -0.0008 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.0007 -0.0051 0.07 -0.04 
(0.0003) (0.002)  (0.012) (0.004) (0.0002) .0008) (0.018)  (0.009) 
    
exiting 
products 
0.0023 0.17 0.14 0.04 0.0014 0.0093 -0.02 0.16 
(0.0006) (0.005)  (0.017) (0.007) (0.0008) .0007) (0.007) (0.025) 
    
price effect 0.36 0.19 0.48 0.43 -0.09 -0.11 1.41 -0.25 
(0.018) (0.006)  (0.105) (0.031) (0.008)  .006) (0.119)  (0.098) 
    
quantity effect 0.57 0.50 0.30 0.51 0.99 0.86 -0.60 1.05 
(0.017)  (0.007) (0.103) (0.026) (0.009) .007) (0.123) (0.092) 
    
contin. prod., p 
and q unobs. 
0.07 0.14 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.25 0.13 0.07 
(0.004)  (0.002)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.004) .003) (0.012) (0.014) 
                  
N 230 5237 225 242 228 4959 216 205 
value in 2008, 
billions of US$ 1062.1 2966.4 80.5 54.1 451.0 1457.9 32.5 18.0 
value in 2009, 
billions of US$ 724.7 2288.6 70.3 38.8 326.3 1182.0 33.9 16.0 
% change from 
2008 to 2009 -0.32 -0.23 -0.13 -0.28 -0.28 -0.19 0.04 -0.11 
Notes: The time period represented is from the first half of 2008 (pre-crisis) to the first half of 
2009 (mid-crisis). To avoid issues with seasonally-traded products, we do not include the second 
half of 2008. The final row for each region shows the value change for continuing products for 
which we are unable to observe either price or quantity. N represents the number of trading 
partners. For the European Union, this is tallied by importing country (eg, an average of 194 
trading partners for each of the EU’s 27 members). 
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Table 3: Alternative Decomposition of Intensive (Average Value) and Extensive 
(Countries and Products) Margins 
  2007 2008 2009 
% change, 08-
09 
US 
Countries 230 230 230 0.0 
Products 5020 5021 5020 0.0 
country-products 113645 111652 105706 -5.3 
Density 0.098 0.097 0.092 -5.3 
average value, millions of US$ 8.63 9.51 6.86 -27.9 
total value, billions of US$ 981 1062 725 -31.8 
EU 
Countries 240 241 240 -0.4 
Products 5050 5049 5048 0.0 
country-products 1722493 1740935 1696182 -2.6 
Density 0.053 0.053 0.052 -2.1 
average value, millions of US$ 1.67 1.70 1.35 -20.8 
total value, billions of US$ 2879 2966 2289 -22.9 
Brazil 
Countries 195 203 195 -3.9 
Products 4728 4577 4538 -0.9 
country-products 52802 55322 54199 -2.0 
Density 0.057 0.060 0.061 2.9 
average value, millions of US$ 1.28 1.45 1.30 -10.9 
total value, billions of US$ 68 80 70 -12.7 
Indonesia 
Countries 194 195 196 0.5 
Products 4536 4465 4435 -0.7 
country-products 48675 48556 45185 -6.9 
Density 0.055 0.056 0.052 -6.8 
average value, millions of US$ 0.77 1.11 0.86 -22.8 
total value, billions of US$ 37 54 39 -28.2 
Notes: The time period represented is the first half of each year. Here we include territories, such 
as Taiwan and Gibraltar. Results are fairly similar if these are excluded. Density equals the total 
number of country/product pairs, divided by the number of import partners times the number of 
imported products. 
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Table 4: Heterogeneity Across Exporter Income 
UNITED STATES & EUROPEAN UNION % of value change 
  
High 
income  
Upper 
middle 
income  
Lower 
middle 
income  
Low 
income  
new products -0.05 -0.12 -0.06 -1.28 
exiting products 0.05 0.09 0.10 1.05 
price effect 0.11 0.57 0.29 -0.35 
quantity effect 0.74 0.38 0.57 1.42 
contin. prod., p and q unobserved 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.16 
total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
total value in 2008, billions of US$ 2779.4 624.2 561.4 29.7 
total value in 2009, billions of US$ 2100.6 429.1 449.1 28.4 
% change from 2008 to 2009 -0.24 -0.31 -0.20 -0.04 
BRAZIL & INDONESIA % of value change 
  
High 
income  
Upper 
middle 
income  
Lower 
middle 
income  
Low 
income  
new products -0.25 -0.13 -0.11 -1.50 
exiting products 0.22 0.28 0.19 2.54 
price effect -0.28 0.24 -0.31 0.37 
quantity effect 1.23 0.54 1.04 -0.02 
contin. prod., p and q unobserved 0.07 0.07 0.19 -0.38 
total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
total value in 2008, billions of US$ 76.6 25.3 31.9 0.7 
total value in 2009, billions of US$ 64.5 17.7 26.2 0.6 
% change from 2008 to 2009 -0.16 -0.30 -0.18 -0.07 
Notes: The time period represented is from the first half of 2008 (pre-crisis) to the first half of 
2009 (mid-crisis). To avoid issues with seasonally-traded products, we do not include the second 
half of 2008. The final row for each region shows the value change for continuing products for 
which we are unable to observe either price or quantity. 
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Table 5: Heterogeneity across Product Type, US Imports 
% of value change 
US 
ne
w
 
pr
od
uc
ts
 
ex
iti
ng
 
pr
od
uc
ts
 
pr
ic
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
qu
an
tit
y 
ef
fe
ct
 
p 
an
d 
q 
un
ob
 
to
ta
l total value 
change, 
millions of 
US$ 
Animal -0.06 0.09 0.54 0.42 0.00 1.00 -712 
Chemicals -0.04 0.12 -0.19 0.97 0.14 1.00 -11,941 
Foodstuffs -0.08 0.07 0.61 0.35 0.06 1.00 -1,284 
Footwear -0.01 0.01 -0.69 1.44 0.25 1.00 -1,135 
Leather 0.00 0.01 -0.48 1.40 0.08 1.00 -963 
Machinery, 
electrical -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.76 0.18 1.00 -57,448 
Metals -0.02 0.08 0.22 0.63 0.09 1.00 -23,443 
Mineral -0.01 0.01 0.88 0.11 0.01 1.00 -133,931 
Miscellaneous -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.60 0.46 1.00 -14,047 
Plastics -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.88 0.08 1.00 -6,824 
Stone/glass -0.01 0.02 0.31 0.52 0.16 1.00 -11,749 
Textiles -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.89 0.10 1.00 -6,531 
Transportation 0.00 0.00 -0.03 1.01 0.01 1.00 -55,343 
Vegetable -0.06 0.05 0.57 0.40 0.05 1.00 -1,602 
Wood -0.01 0.02 0.09 0.86 0.05 1.00 -6,001 
Notes: The time period represented is from the first half of 2008 (pre-crisis) to the first half of 
2009 (mid-crisis). To avoid issues with seasonally-traded products, we do not include the second 
half of 2008. The “p and q unob” column shows the value change for continuing products for 
which we are unable to observe either price or quantity. 
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Table 6: Heterogeneity in Commodities versus Manufactures 
UNITED STATES  % of value change 
  homogenous reference priced differentiated unclassified 
new products -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
exiting products 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 
price effect 0.90 0.44 -0.06 0.36 
quantity effect 0.10 0.47 0.92 0.47 
contin. prod., p and q unobserved 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.17 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
total value in 2008, billions of US$ 212.0 109.4 451.0 289.7 
total value in 2009, billions of US$ 102.8 71.9 326.3 223.6 
% change from 2008 to 2009 -0.51 -0.34 -0.28 -0.23 
EUROPEAN UNION % of value change 
  homogenous reference priced differentiated unclassified 
new products -0.05 -0.19 -0.06 -0.11 
exiting products 0.09 0.27 0.07 0.12 
price effect 0.73 0.25 -0.24 0.09 
quantity effect 0.20 0.54 1.01 0.76 
contin. prod., p and q unobserved 0.03 0.13 0.22 0.14 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
total value in 2008, billions of US$ 368.9 479.6 1457.9 660.0 
total value in 2009, billions of US$ 216.3 346.2 1182.0 544.0 
% change from 2008 to 2009 -0.41 -0.28 -0.19 -0.18 
INDONESIA % of value change 
  homogenous reference priced differentiated unclassified 
new products -0.06 -0.25 -0.31 -0.08 
exiting products 0.13 0.19 0.60 0.07 
price effect 0.75 0.28 -1.58 0.50 
quantity effect 0.14 0.54 2.07 0.47 
contin. prod., p and q unobserved 0.05 0.24 0.23 0.04 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
total value in 2008, billions of US$ 10.3 9.5 18.0 16.2 
total value in 2009, billions of US$ 6.0 7.0 16.0 9.8 
% change from 2008 to 2009 -0.42 -0.26 -0.11 -0.40 
BRAZIL % of value change 
  homogenous reference priced differentiated unclassified 
new products -0.06 -0.13 0.87 -0.28 
exiting products 0.12 0.25 -0.46 0.47 
price effect 0.81 -0.39 5.04 -1.08 
quantity effect 0.14 0.94 -4.81 1.84 
contin. prod., p and q unobserved 0.00 0.33 0.36 0.05 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
total value in 2008, billions of US$ 12.1 15.8 32.5 20.1 
total value in 2009, billions of US$ 7.1 12.0 33.9 17.4 
% change from 2008 to 2009 -0.41 -0.24 0.04 -0.13 
Notes: The time period represented is from the first half of 2008 (pre-crisis) to the first half of 
2009 (mid-crisis). To avoid issues with seasonally-traded products, we do not include the second 
half of 2008. The final row for each product type shows the value change for continuing products 
for which we are unable to observe either price or quantity. 
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Table 7: Heterogeneity across Trading Partner Income/Region, Manufactures Only 
UNITED STATES  
& EUROPEAN UNION % of value change 
  
High 
income 
trading 
partner 
Upper 
middle 
income 
trading 
partner 
Lower 
middle 
income 
trading 
partner 
Low 
income 
trading 
partner China 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
new products -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 0.66 -0.05 -0.97 
exiting products 0.04 0.10 0.16 -0.22 0.06 0.32 
price effect -0.15 -0.07 -0.79 1.44 -1.16 0.40 
quantity effect 0.95 0.91 1.54 -0.90 1.89 1.17 
contin. prod., p and q unobserved 0.20 0.14 0.21 0.02 0.26 0.08 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
total value in 2008, billions of US$ 1454.3 175.9 257.8 17.3 187.2 7.9 
total value in 2009, billions of US$ 1121.5 132.8 233.6 18.5 172.8 6.6 
% change from 2008 to 2009 -0.23 -0.24 -0.09 0.07 -0.08 -0.16 
BRAZIL & INDONESIA % of value change 
  
High 
income 
trading 
partner 
Upper 
middle 
income 
trading 
partner 
Lower 
middle 
income 
trading 
partner 
Low 
income 
trading 
partner China 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
new products -2.19 -2.83 -1.29 0.53 0.18 -0.31 
exiting products 1.66 6.99 1.77 -0.47 -0.31 0.59 
price effect -11.28 -14.43 -14.70 0.69 5.04 -0.54 
quantity effect 12.98 11.51 14.61 0.12 -3.71 1.24 
contin. prod., p and q unobserved -0.18 -0.24 0.61 0.12 -0.21 0.02 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
total value in 2008, billions of US$ 32.3 6.3 11.7 0.2 8.0 0.2 
total value in 2009, billions of US$ 31.7 6.2 11.5 0.3 8.4 0.1 
% change from 2008 to 2009 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.29 0.05 -0.27 
Notes: The time period represented is from the first half of 2008 (pre-crisis) to the first half of 
2009 (mid-crisis). To avoid issues with seasonally-traded products, we do not include the second 
half of 2008. The European Union and Brazil report quantities in various units, and accordingly 
cannot be evaluated with the above decomposition. Data for the US is based on value and weight 
of air and vessel shipments, and accordingly does not sum to total imports. 
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Table 8: OLS Regression Decomposition, by Dependence on External 
Finance (High versus Low) 
  United States European Union 
  high low 
t-
values high low 
t-
values 
new -0.0009 -0.0003 -1.1 -0.0051 -0.0017 -1.74 
(0.0005)  (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.001) 
exit 0.0028 0.0009 0.98 0.0059 0.0106 -3.01 
 (0.003)  (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0009) 
price effect -0.272 -0.029 -14.12 -0.017 -0.131 8.87 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) 
quantity effect 1.01 1.00 0.59 0.80 0.83 -2.07 
(0.010) (0.009)  (0.010) (0.008) 
continuing, 
unobserved 
0.264 0.033 28.64 0.218 0.293 -9.40 
(0.007)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
n 224 225   4604 4462   
total value in 2008, 
billions of US$ 194.4 252.4  566.4 880.0  
total value in 2009, 
billions of US$ 153.2 169.5  478.3 694.6  
% change from 
2008 to 2009 -0.21 -0.33  -0.16 -0.21  
Brazil Indonesia 
high low t-values high low 
t-
values 
new 0.0285 0.0974 -2.10 -0.0079 -0.0273 1.42 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.010) (0.009) 
exit 0.0156 -0.0151 2.52 0.4566 -0.0309 15.46 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.031) (0.012) 
price effect 0.490 1.258 -3.89 -0.045 -0.314 2.18 
(0.159) (0.091) (0.074) (0.091) 
quantity effect 0.46 -0.47 4.55 0.52 1.28 -6.35 
(0.163) (0.095) (0.069) (0.089) 
continuing, 
unobserved 
0.007 0.131 -4.3 0.077 0.093 -0.73 
(0.014)  (0.016) (0.020)  (0.012) 
n 202 177   189 177   
total value in 2008, 
billions of US$ 12.4 19.8  7.5 10.4  
total value in 2009, 
billions of US$ 12.0 21.6  6.1 9.8  
% change from 
2008 to 2009 -0.03 0.09  -0.19 -0.06  
Notes: The time period represented is from the first half of 2008 (pre-crisis) to the first half of  
2009 (mid-crisis). To avoid issues with seasonally-traded products, we do not include the second  
half of 2008. N represents the number of trading partners. For the European Union, this is tallied  
by importing country (eg, an average of 194 trading partners for each of the EU’s 27 members).  
T-values are for the hypothesis that the coefficient in the "high" equation is equal to the coeff- 
icient in the "low" equation. 
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Appendix A: Country Groupings by Income 
 
HIGH 
Andorra 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Aruba 
Australia 
Austria 
Bahamas, The 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Belgium 
Bermuda 
Brunei Darussalam 
Canada 
Cayman Islands 
Channel Islands 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Faeroe Islands 
Finland 
France 
French Polynesia 
Germany 
Greece 
Greenland 
Guam 
Hong Kong, China 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Isle of Man 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. 
Kuwait 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Macao, China 
Malta 
Monaco 
Netherlands 
Netherlands Antilles 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Northern Mariana Isl. 
Norway 
Oman 
Portugal 
Puerto Rico 
Qatar 
San Marino 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Trinidad and Tobago 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
 
UPPER MIDDLE 
Algeria 
American Samoa 
Argentina 
Belarus 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Grenada 
Jamaica 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Macedonia, FYR 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Mayotte 
Mexico 
Montenegro 
Namibia 
Palau 
Panama 
Peru 
Poland 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
South Africa 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
Suriname 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
 
LOWER MIDDLE 
Albania 
Angola 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belize 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
China 
Congo, Rep. 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Georgia 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kiribati 
Kosovo 
Lesotho 
Maldives 
Marshall Islands 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Samoa 
São Tomé & Principe 
Solomon Islands 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Tonga 
Tunisia 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Vanuatu 
West Bank and Gaza 
 
LOW 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Kenya 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao PDR 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Yemen, Rep. 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix B: Groupings by Product Section 
 
ANIMAL: Live animals, animal products 
HS 1 Live animals   
HS 2  Meat and edible meat offal   
HS 3  Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates   
HS 4  Dairy produce; birds eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included   
HS 5  Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included  
  
VEGETABLE: Vegetable products, animal or vegetable fats and oils and waxes 
HS 6  Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage   
HS 7 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers   
HS 8  Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons   
HS 9  Coffee, tea, maté and spices   
HS 10  Cereals   
HS 11  Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten   
HS 12  Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruits; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder   
HS 13  Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts   
HS 14  Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included  
HS 15  Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes  
 
FOODSTUFFS: Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, vinegar, tobacco and substitutes 
HS 16 Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates   
HS 17 Sugars and sugar confectionery   
HS 18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations  
HS 19 Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; bakers' wares   
HS 20  Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants  
HS 21 Miscellaneous edible preparations   
HS 22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar   
HS 23 Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal feed  
HS 24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 
  
MINERALS: Mineral products 
HS 25  Salt; sulfur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement  
HS 26  Ores, slag and ash   
HS 27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes   
 
CHEMICALS: Products of the chemical or allied industries 
HS 28 Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorgani c compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals,of radioactive elements or 
of isotopes  
HS 29 Organic chemicals  
HS 30  Pharmaceutical products  
HS 31  Fertilizers  
HS 32 Tanning or dyeing extracts; dyes, pigments, paints, varnishes, putty and mastics  
HS 33 Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations  
HS 34 Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, 
polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modeling pastes, "dental waxes" and dental 
preparations with a basis of plaster   
HS 35 Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes  
HS 36 Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations   
HS 37 Photographic or cinematographic goods  
HS 38 Miscellaneous chemical products   
 
PLASTICS: Plastics and rubber and articles thereof  
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HS 39  Plastics and articles thereof   
HS 40  Rubber and articles thereof   
 
LEATHER: Raw hides and skins, leather, furskins, articles thereof 
HS 41 Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather  
HS 42 Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than 
silkworm gut)  
HS 43  Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof   
 
WOOD: Wood and articles thereof, charcoal, cork and articles thereof, basketware, pulp, paper, printing  
HS 44 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal   
HS 45 Cork and articles of cork   
HS 46  Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork   
HS 47 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; waste and scrap of paper or paperboard  
HS 48 Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard   
HS 49  Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans   
 
TEXILTES: Textile and textile articles 
HS 50 Silk  
HS 51 Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric  
HS 52  Cotton  
HS 53  Other vegetable textile fibers; paper yarn and woven fabric of paper yarn   
HS 54 Man-made filaments 
HS 55 Man-made staple fibers   
HS 56 Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns, twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof   
HS 57 Carpets and other textile floor coverings   
HS 58 Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace, tapestries; trimmings; embroidery  
HS 59 Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use   
HS 60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics  
HS 61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted   
HS 62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted   
HS 63 Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags   
 
FOOTWEAR/HEADGEAR: Footwear, headgear, umbrellas 
HS 64 Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles  
HS 65 Headgear and parts thereof   
HS 66 Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seatsticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof   
HS 67 Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair   
 
STONE/GLASS: Articles of stone, plaster cement, asbestos, mica, ceramics, glass 
HS 68 Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials   
HS 69 Ceramic products  
HS 70  Glass and glassware  
HS 71  Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones,precious metals, metals clad with precious metal and articles 
thereof; imitation jewelry; coin   
 
METALS: Base metals and articles thereof 
HS 72 Iron and steel   
HS 73 Articles of iron or steel   
HS 74  Copper and articles thereof   
HS 75  Nickel and articles thereof   
HS 76 Aluminum and articles thereof  
HS 77 (Reserved for possible future use)   
HS 78 Lead and articles thereof   
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HS 79 Zinc and articles thereof   
HS 80 Tin and articles thereof   
HS 81 Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof  
HS 82 Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal   
HS 83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal   
 
MACHINERY/ELECTRICAL: Machinery, mechanical appliances, electrical equipment and parts 
HS 84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof   
HS 85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound 
recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles  
 
TRANSPORTATION: vehicles, aircraft, vessels, transport equipment 
HS 86 Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts 
thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds   
HS 87 Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof  
HS 88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof  
HS 89 Ships, boats and floating structures   
 
MISCELLANEOUS   
HS 90  Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; 
parts and accessories thereof   
HS 91  Clocks and watches and parts thereof   
HS 92  Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles  
HS 93 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof   
HS 94 Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not 
elsewhere specified or included; illuminated sign illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings  
HS 95 Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof   
HS 96 Miscellaneous manufactured articles  
HS 97 Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques  
HS 98 Special classification provisions  
HS 99 Temporary legislation; temporary modifications proclaimed pursuant to trade agreements legislation; additional import 
restrictions proclaimed pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended   
